“When he showed up at the Fed, he basically did not know much about macroeconomics or monetary policy,” says Seth Carpenter, chief U.S. economist at UBS who spent 15 years at the Fed, including time overlapping with Powell. “He made a conscious decision to spend a lot of time with staff and colleagues to learn as deeply and completely as possible.”So, Powell appears to be conscientious in seeking advice about things he doesn't know much about. But, the Board may actually not be a great place to learn macroeconomics - the Board staff aren't known for their independent thinking, for example. Further, a Board Governor is not in the best position to learn, as he or she does not have a staff, and is dependent on more-or-less randomly assigned economists to get their work done. Indeed, a Governor's job is thankless in more ways than one. He or she currently earns $179,700 per year, which is less than what a good Associate Professor in Economics is paid at a top research school. And the Presidents of the regional Feds are much better remunerated. Dudley (New York Fed) earns $469,500, Williams (San Francisco Fed) earns $468,600, and Bullard (St. Louis Fed) earns $359,100, for example.
But any of those salaries pale in comparison to what Powell had to be earning in the private sector, judging from his accumulated wealth, which appears to be between $20 million and $55 million. So, to his credit, we can infer that Powell is genuinely interested in public service, otherwise he would still be in the private sector, further feathering his own nest. At six years in, he has been at the job longer than is typical for Board Governors, who are appointed for 14 years, but rarely serve the full term, or anything close.
What are Powell's views on monetary policy? He certainly has not been outspoken about it. Brainard and Tarullo have had differences with the consensus view on the FOMC, and weren't shy about talking about it. Stan Fischer, given his long experience as an academic economist and central banker, certainly had a lot to say, and clearly had his own views on policy. Powell, not so much. A quick look through some of Powell's speeches indicates that he typically did not speak specifically on monetary policy. When he did, for example in a 2016 speech, it's boilerplate - basically the consensus FOMC view. I've seen Powell in action only once. I know he said something, but I can't remember what it was. You might say my memory isn't so great, but from the same occasion, I can remember key details of what Kocherlakota, Evans, Brainard, Lacker, Fischer, and Yellen were talking about. Powell, in the general view, is collegial, reasonable, and intelligent. But in instances where we need depth of experience in central banking and knowledge of economics, he'll have to be looking to other people. That's worrisome.
So why was Powell chosen? Some have suggested that, relative to Yellen, Powell leans more toward less financial regulation. That's too deep for Trump, though, I think. Most official high-level Trump appointments are of three types: (i) person bent on destroying the institution he or she is assigned to run; (ii) General - either active or retired; (iii) rich white male. Powell is type (iii). Just be thankful he isn't type (i) or (ii).
But why didn't Trump just stick with Janet Yellen? After all, he claimed he liked her, right? Well, Yellen is neither male nor rich, so she has two strikes against her, in Trump's mind. Further, Trump seems convinced that people he appoints owe him favors. In Trumpland, an Obama appointee just can't have the right predilections.
But is Yellen a great loss? The New York Times editorial board thinks so. Adam Davidson, in the New Yorker, says that Janet Yellen is a "master of thinking in public." Jena McGregor, in the Washington Post, collects a lot of favorable quotes relating to Yellen's record as Fed Chair, and remarks on the loss of a woman in a position of power, where there currently are few.
From my point of view, Yellen was successful in forging consensus on the FOMC. Apparently, she didn't force her views on others (unlike Greenspan, for example), and the FOMC seems to have operated in a collegial fashion for the last four years. There were some dissents, but given the context there really wasn't that much friction. After all, the Fed was dealing with a unique situation - the large balance sheet that had been built up under Bernanke, and an unprecedentedly long period of essentially-zero overnight nominal interest rates. Deciding when and how to unwind that was no easy task. That said, Yellen's training (PhD 1971) put her out of touch with modern macroeconomics, and she appeared to have a religious devotion to the Phillips curve. With respect to the latter, she has plenty of company in the rest of the central banking community, but that's no excuse. As well, Yellen is well-known for her reluctance to appear in public - Adam Davidson's characterization of her as a "master of thinking in public" is nonsense, I think. As far as I can tell, thinking in public and walking on hot coals are more or less equivalent for Janet Yellen. This is, I think, why Yellen persisted in holding press conferences only after every other FOMC meeting - a decision that implied that nothing would ever happen at FOMC meetings held in January, May, July, or October. Yellen always insisted that all meetings were live, but the off meetings were live in the sense that a person who is unconscious and on a respirator is live - he or she isn't about to get up and run around.
That said, it's hard to see how the Fed will be better-run under Powell than Yellen. The failure to reappoint Yellen is just another instance in this administration of a break with precedent that weakens American institutions - this time the damage is to Fed independence. Further, our progress toward being a gender-blind society has been set back, and that's a big deal.
Very interesting column, sir. Have a good day :)ReplyDelete
Your remark, a criticism in fact, that Powell's appointment is a set-back to progress towards a "gender-blind society" is mis-placed. In a "gender-blind" society, gender is ignored as a criterion, by definition. It does not mean that gender must be factored into each and every decision, nor does it mean that an imbalance in the gender composition of an organization must righted to attain a 50:50 make up by gender throughout the organization, as some persons such as left-leaning Canadian politicians would have one believe. Nor is it necessary that the Fed chair be held by a female going forward, simply because the current chair is held by a female. As to the appointment process, it is in the president's gift to decide whom to appoint and whom to retire, in accordance with powers granted under the Constitution. If one doesn't agree with how the Constitution divies up the power to appoint and fire federal civil servants, then work to change the Constitution so that it is more to your liking. As to whether Powell will make a good or bad Fed chair, that assessment is before the senate now under the 'advice and consent' provisions of the Constitution. Under a republican form of government that's as good as it can get. If professors of macroeconomics want a say in that decision they are more than able to do so by making representation to the senate committee examining and appraising Powell's nomination. If you truly feel that Powell's appointment would disadvantage the Fed and reduce the Fed's independence, such as it is, then make the case for that view where it counts, namely in the halls and corridors and committee neeting rooms of the capital.ReplyDelete
The history of 'strong' Fed chairs is decidedly mixed. Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke, might have been accomplished academics before appointment to the Fed chair, but their terms in office were at best mixed blessings, and at worst decided disasters, for the policies they championed. The question to be asked and answered is whether or not a 'strong chair' is a benefit or a detriment to the economy and society as a whole. Whether professors of macroeconomics are pleased or displeased is irrelevant. Powell may turn out be one of the best Fed chairs in a generation, or he turn out to be a 'lemon'. If developing consensus and elucidating an optimal policy for the Fed going-forward is the primary purpose of the chair, then Powell is as likely as not to fill that role and serve that purpose as any, his lack of academic modern macroeconomics credentials notwithstanding. Indeed his lack of a formal macroeconomics education might well be an advantage, given the current state of academic disagreements in that field today. If he requires guidance he need only call on your goodself and others of a similar disposition for appropriate and independent counsel as and when needed.
All is not bleak. Despite an apparent set-back in progress towards a 'gender neutral' or "gender blind" social order, the world is not at risk of dropping off the edge of the liberal cliff into a dark and bottomless void of abject and reactionary conservatism. The night-time skies are often darkest just before the crack of dawn. Be of good cheer.
1. The comment on "gender-blind," referred specifically to the choice of Powell vs. Yellen. In this case, it seems clear that Yellen is better-qualified but, consistent with his other choices, Trump prefers the man, even when there is precedent for sticking with what you've got.Delete
2. Are you suggesting that the only forum in which I should be able to say anything is in a Senate hearing? I can't blog about it?
3. Volcker did not have a PhD. Greenspan had one, but received it under questionable circumstances. We wouldn't call either an "accomplished academic." Bernanke is different. He was a tenured professor at Princeton, and had well-cited publications in top economics journals.
4. If you think things are not bleak, open your eyes and look around you.
Very insightful observations, especially the one about Trump's conviction that people he appoints owe him favors.ReplyDelete